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Abstract This paper combines income and expenditure with time use data to
provide a unique picture of the labor supply, household production, saving and
consumption decisions of two-adult households over a life cycle defined in terms of
the presence and ages of children. The study also draws on data for household
borrowing and lending, direct and indirect benefits and taxes to calibrate a ‘‘family’’
life cycle model at the core of which is the hypothesis that households face a
borrowing interest rate that rises with the amount of non-collateral based borrowing.
The household members jointly choose time paths of time use, consumption and
saving over their life cycle in the face of this capital market imperfection. Impor-
tantly, households are shown to differ significantly in their saving behavior in a way
that depends on secondary earner labor supply, with a strong positive association
between saving and the income of the second earner. The results differ sharply from
those of the existing literature.
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1 Introduction
The main preoccupation of the literature on consumption choice over the life cycle
has been the ‘‘excess sensitivity puzzle’’.1 This puzzle arose out of household
expenditure survey data that showed household consumption expenditure tracking
income over the life cycle in a way that is hard to reconcile with the premise that the
capital market allows the household to decouple its consumption and income paths.
The leading contenders for resolution of this puzzle seem to be: precautionary or
buffer-stock saving;2 liquidity constraints in the extreme form of the complete
absence of borrowing possibilities;3 and demographic effects, especially the
presence of children.4
However, the modelling approach adopted in these studies fails to take account of
one of the single most important socio-economic developments over the last half
century, the large expansion in female labor supply overall, with at the same time
considerable heterogeneity across households in this respect. In many OECD
countries, for example the US, UK, Germany and Australia, the labor supply of
prime aged married women is now around half that of married men in the same age
category and highly heterogeneous across households with similar demographic
characteristics and wage rates.
These observations have far-reaching implications for the household’s labor supply
and income generation process and for its consumption and saving decisions which are
completely missed by the standard model, because of the convention of treating the
family as a single person5 and the failure to recognise household production as a close
substitute for female labor supply after (though not before) the arrival of children.
In this paper we combine time use and household expenditure survey data for
Australia to show that it is essential to take account of the multi-person nature of the
household and the allocation of time to household production by the female partner, as
the second earner in the large majority of households. When we expand the data set to
include the household’s non-market time allocation decisions, we see that it is
precisely because of the level and across-household variation in female labor supply
that the assumption of a single person household with an exogenous process of
household income determination is no longer sustainable. In other words, possible
exogenous uncertainty in the income of the primary household earner may be small
beer compared to the variations in household income generated by endogenous
1 See Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996), Browning and Crossley (2001) and Carroll (2001).
2 See for example Carroll (1992), (1994), (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
3 See for example Deaton (1992).
4 See for example Attanasio and Browning (1995), Blundell et al. (1994), and Browning and Ejrnaes
(2002).
5 Interestingly enough though, Friedman (1957), in defining his Permanent Income Hypothesis, is careful
to refer to the ‘‘ earners’’in his ‘‘consumer unit’’in the plural. This is perhaps because he does not derive
his hypothesis from an explicit model of the utility maximizing household. Ando and Modigliani (1963),
on the other hand, in the formulation of their Life Cycle Hypothesis, do so, and so treat the household as a
single individual, which tradition has been followed in the literature ever since.
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choices of secondary earner labor supply. This leads to an approach which integrates
life cycle choices of market and non-market time allocations and consumptions.6
In adopting this approach we incorporate elements of both demographics and
capital market imperfections. Decisions on female labor supply are closely related
to the presence of children and the choice of sources of supply of child care.
Moreover, it seems possible to explain the data on life cycle consumption only by
assuming some kind of capital market imperfection, though our data set, which
gives detailed information for each household on purpose, source, amount and cost
of borrowing, does not support the extreme assumption of no borrowing. Also, we
certainly would not rule out the possibility that some saving could be precautionary
in nature, but do not believe, from our inspection of the data, that this can be
anything like a complete explanation of household consumption behavior over the
life cycle.
An important feature of our modelling approach is the characterization of the life
cycle not in terms of calendar years, but rather in terms of the phases through which
a typical family goes over its lifetime.7 By organising the data in this way we are
trying to bring out more clearly than in the existing literature the effects of children
on the time allocation and labor supply decisions of the household, and, through
that, on its income stream and saving decisions. Thus we argue that the time paths of
saving and consumption of market goods reflect the movements in household
income that are determined by changes in female labor supply over time, which in
turn are determined by the process of substitution between market and household
work associated with bringing up children.8
The high across-household variation in female labor supply and the correspond-
ing variation in gross household income do not lead to a similar variation in across-
household market consumption expenditure. This is partly because government
taxation and family payment policies redistribute heavily from two-earner to single-
earner households, so that incomes net of taxes and benefits are more equal, and
partly because saving behavior depends very closely on female labor supply. For
example, households with no significant female labor supply do virtually no saving
once they have children, other than that involved in house purchase and
superannuation schemes, and at the same time they borrow more heavily in the
short term to maintain consumption. Controlling for primary earner income,
households with high female labor supply invest more in housing and borrow less
6 The paper by Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2003) adopts an approach similar in spirit to this
paper, but quite different in detail. It uses a life cycle model with endogenous female labor force
participation, consumption and saving decisions to explain the changes in female participation across
three age cohorts in the US.
7 See Heathcote et al. (2008) for a similar approach in the context of household labor supplies.
8 This bears a superficial resemblance to the model of Baxter and Jermann (1999). They explain the
tendency for consumption of market goods to track income by arguing that as the wage rate rises over the
life cycle, goods produced in the household (of which the most important is surely child care) become
more expensive, and therefore substitution toward market goods takes place. In a sense they are spelling
out a source of the non-separability between consumption (of market goods) and household non-labor
time that was the basis for Heckman’s (1974) contribution. However, the problem with this theory is that
the domestic production is carried out predominantly by the female, whose wage tends not to rise over the
life cycle due to withdrawal from the workforce.
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short term to finance consumption. Thus there is a high propensity to save out of
second earner income.9
The heterogeneity in female labor supply may not be associated with similar
differences in household welfare levels. The effective tax system that households at
low to average income levels face defines a piecewise linear budget constraint in the
space of gross and net income, with an effective marginal tax rate that falls with
income over this range.10 It is then easy to show that two households may be in
equilibrium very far apart in their female labor supply decisions but close together
in their achieved welfare level. A small difference in household characteristics can
be transformed into a large difference in female labor supply by a piecewise linear
tax system that defines a non-convex budget constraint.11
2 A family life cycle model
We divide the life cycle into four periods, assumed of equal length for simplicity.12
In every period except the last a couple allocates its time between market work,
household production and leisure. Period 1 is the pre-children phase, in period 2
children are present, in period 3 they have left the household, and in period 4 the
couple has retired, and so the only uses of time are household work and leisure. We
analyze first the within-period choices of expenditure and time allocations, and then
the intertemporal allocation of expenditures.
2.1 Period 1
The individuals f and m jointly choose consumptions of the market and household goods
xi1, yi1 and leisure zi1, i = f, m, to maximize a household welfare function (HWF)
H1½uf ðxf 1; yf 1; zf 1Þ; umðxm1; ym1; zm1Þ ð1Þ
subject to the following constraints. First, household production is given by
X
i¼f ;m
yi1 ¼ y1 ¼ hðtf 1; tm1; jÞ ð2Þ
with h(.) a concave, linear homogeneous production function, j an exogenous
productivity indicator that varies across households, and ti1 are time inputs. The
budget13 and time constraints with li1 denoting labor supplies are
9 A number of studies that adopt the single-person household model, either implicitly or explicitly, report a fall
in the saving rate with an increase in female labor market participation. See, for example, Attanasio and Banks
(1998). However, the relevant rate is that with respect to the second income, which we find to be strongly
positive. In this study we support these arguments by drawing on Australian data, but other work we have done
(see in particular Apps and Rees, 2009) shows that similar conclusions can be drawn for the UK and US.
10 This is true not only in Australia but also in the US and UK.
11 For further discussion of the theory and empirical observations underlying this remark see Apps and
Rees (2009), Ch 6, and Apps et al. (2009).
12 In the empirical treatment below we refine this substantially, increasing the number of phases to six
and allowing them to have variable length.
13 Non wage income l can include fixed pension or superannuation contributions and so may be negative.






wi1li1 þ l1 ð3Þ
ti1 þ li1 þ zi1 ¼ 1 i ¼ f ; m ð4Þ
We can find the implicit price of the household good, p1, as the marginal (= average)
cost of its production, c(wf1, wm1; j), and collapse the three constraints into the
single full income constraint
X
i¼f ;m
ðxi1 þ p1yi1 þ wi1zi1Þ ¼ X1 ð5Þ
In a single period model, the income on the right hand side of this constraint would
be given by
P
i=f,mwi1 ? l1, which we call full income, available for consumption
of all goods, including the household good and leisure. However, we know that by
use of the capital market, the value of full consumption, the left hand side of (5), can
deviate from full income in that period, and so the right hand side of (5), X1, which
we call full expenditure, is yet to be determined.







i1 and inserting the former into the household welfare function gives
the period 1 value function V1(p1, wf1, wm1, X1). Life cycle considerations have
their effect on period 1 decisions via the choice of X1. Given this, the within-period
allocation is determined by wage rates and the price of the household good.
2.2 Period 2
We model children by including them as individuals with their own utility
functions, which appear in the HWF. Without real loss of generality we can assume
just one child with the utility function uk(xk2, yk2, ck), where ck is child care,
produced by using parental time inputs tik and a bought in market child care input b,
with production function, also concave and linear homogeneous, given by
ck(tfk, tmk, b). As before, we can define prices for the household good, and child
care, given by p2 = c(w21, wm2; j) and q = cc(wf2, wm2, pb), with c (.) and cc(.) the
respective unit cost functions and pb the price of the bought in child care input. The
HWF now becomes
H2½uf ðxf 2; yf 2; zf 2Þ; umðxm2; ym2; zm2Þ; ukðxk2; yk2; ckÞ ð6Þ
Given the parental time constraints on the four possible uses of time
ti2 þ tik þ li2 þ zi2 ¼ 1 i ¼ f ; m ð7Þ
the full expenditure budget constraint is
X
i¼f ;m;k
ðxi2 þ p2yi2Þ þ
X
i¼f ;m
wi2zi2 þ qck ¼ X2 ð8Þ
We assume here that children supply neither domestic nor market labor. We solve
for the demands for market and domestic goods and child care, and for the parental
time allocations, to derive the value function for this period, V2(p2, wf2, wm2, q, X2).
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The effect of the presence of children in the household is to add to the demand for
market and domestic consumption goods and to create demand for a new good,
child care. All these demands will now depend inter alia on the price of child care
which, in turn, except at a corner solution in which only parental time is used, will
depend on the price of market child care as well as parental wage rates.14 This
model therefore suggests that across-household variations in consumptions, labor
supplies and the mix of market and parental child care would be explained by
variation in wage rates, the price of market child care, and productivities in
producing domestic goods and child care.
2.3 Period 3
On the assumption that when the children leave home, they place no further
demands on parental time and income,15 the period three problem is identical to that
in period 1, and in the same way yields the value function V3(p3, wf3, wm3, X3).
2.4 Period 4
Since the individuals have retired, li4 = 0 by definition, and so the model is as in
period 3 except that the budget and time constraints are
X
i¼f ;m
xi4 ¼ X4 ð9Þ
ti4 þ zi4 ¼ 1 i ¼ f ; m ð10Þ
The household’s nonwage income in this period, l4, consists entirely of transfer
payments from pension or superannuation schemes (but not, of course, income from
the returns to past saving on the capital market). The household maximizes its HWF
H4½uf ðxf 4; yf 4; zf 4Þ; umðxm4; ym4; zm4Þ ð11Þ
subject to the above three constraints together with the production function
constraint. We derive the value function V4(X4) as before. Note that no wage rates
enter into this value function. All prices and wage rates in this retirement period are
implicit or shadow prices, determined endogenously at the household optimum by
the values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the various constraints.
Note that now all non leisure time can be devoted to household production, which
could be rather cheap at the margin. Thus it would not be surprising to see a major
substitution of household production for market goods, and this could well be the
explanation of the ‘‘retirement income puzzle’’ discussed by Banks et al (1998).16
14 Where the optimal time allocation implies that one partner reduces market labor supply to zero, the
corresponding market wage rate gives only a lower bound on the opportunity cost of that individual’s
time.
15 The relaxation of this assumption would be an important area for future work. For a study of the
effects of parent’s and children’s income on the decision of children to leave home, see le Blanc and
Wolff (2006).
16 This suggestion is supported in a detailed study by Aguiar and Hurst (2005).
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Given the standard assumption of intertemporal separability of utility—in this
case household welfare—we can now analyse the determination of the time stream
of full expenditures, X1,...,X4. This obviously will depend upon what we assume
about the capital market. We consider two possibilities.
2.5 Case 1: a perfect capital market
Assume the household members agree on the intertemporal felicity discount factor
















þ d3l4  W ð12Þ
where l4 includes all non-capital market income such as state pensions, superan-
nuation payments and so on, and W denotes wealth.
The full consumption stream can be decoupled from the full income stream and is
chosen to satisfy the condition that discounted marginal utility of full expenditure
on consumption of market and household goods and leisure, and on child care in




V 0t ðXt Þ ¼ k t ¼ 1; . . .; 4 ð13Þ
with k* the marginal utility of household wealth.
2.6 Case 2: an imperfect capital market
The household can save at a given (low) interest rate rs, or borrow at an interest rate
rbt = r(bt) in any period t = 1,..., 4, where the interest rate is an increasing function
of borrowing bt. A kink in the intertemporal budget constraint is created by the
assumption that r(0) [ rs. A household may be in equilibrium by lending at rate rs,
borrowing at a marginal cost of mt ðbt Þ  1 þ rðbt Þ þ r0ðbt Þbt ; or neither. A large
difference r(0) - rs could lead to many households being in this latter position.








wit þ lt  st þ bt þ ð1 þ rsÞst1  ð1 þ rb;t1Þbt1 ð15Þ
bt  0; st  0 t ¼ 1; . . .; 4; li4 ¼ s0 ¼ b0 ¼ s4 ¼ b4 ¼ 0 ð16Þ
The key difference between the perfect and imperfect capital market models lies
in the impact of changes in household per capita income in a given period on
consumption in that period. In the case of a perfect capital market that impact is
diffused over the entire lifetime. In an imperfect capital market, a change in income
in a given period can have a large effect on optimal consumption in that period, the
more so, the greater the slope of the borrowing rate function.
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3 Data and life cycle phases
We combine time use and household income and expenditure data from two
surveys:17 the Australian bureau of statistics (ABS) 2005–2006 time use survey
(TUS) and the ABS 2003–2004 household expenditure survey (HES). The TUS
provides detailed information collected by diary, for two diary days, on the
allocation of time to labor market activities and to nine non-market activity episode
classifications: personal care, education, domestic activities, child care, purchasing
goods and services, voluntary work and care, social and community interaction,
active recreation and passive leisure. We aggregate non-market activities into three
categories: domestic work, child care and leisure. We refer to the total time
allocated to domestic work and child care as household production. Leisure is the
sum of time allocations to all other activities. The HES contains data collected by
interview on household consumption expenditure, labor supply, earnings, non-labor
incomes, as well as estimates of government indirect taxes and benefits, and detailed
data on direct taxes and benefits, house price, housing debt, mortgage payments, and
contributions to mandatory retirement saving and to life insurance.
We select couples from each survey excluding only those records reporting
negative incomes in the HES. This gives samples containing 2,085 records from the
TUS and 4,064 records from the HES. Using regression models estimated on the
TUS data, we merge information on time use with income and consumption data for
each record in the HES sample.
To ensure that the time constraint is satisfied, we predict time use ratios. We
estimate as functions of observed variables the ratios of leisure to non-market time
(leisure plus household production), szi ¼ zi=ðti þ tik þ ziÞ and child care to
household production time, stik ¼ tik=ðti þ tikÞ; i ¼ 1; 2, where ti is domestic work,
tik is child care time and zi is leisure. The regressors include dummy variables for
age of youngest child, interaction variables that capture the effect of additional
children at each age of youngest child, and the characteristics of the adults,
including age and dummy variables for education and employment status. Non-
market time is computed from the time constraint as T - li, where T is total time
available. The predicted value for szi is used to compute each individual’s leisure
time as ðT  liÞ  ðszi þ uiÞ; where ui is a randomly selected element from the
residuals of the regression estimated on the TUS data. Household production time is
computed from the time constraint as T - li - zi. Using the result and the predicted
value for szi , the allocation of time to child care is computed by the same procedure.
The sample of couples is partitioned into six broad life cycle phases: Phase 1,
pre-children; Phase 2, pre-school age children; Phase 3, children predominantly of
primary school age; Phase 4, children in later years of high school or in tertiary
education; Phase 5, pre-retirement and post-children; Phase 6, retirement age.
Phase 1 couples are selected on the criteria that there are no dependent children
present in the household and the female partner is aged from 20 to 41 years. In
phase 2 there is at least one child under 5 present. Phase 3 families have at least one
child under 10 and in phase 4 there are only older dependent children present. Phase
17 Both surveys provide data on a common set of demographic, education and occupation variables.
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5 includes couples in which the male partner is under 60 years, the female partner is
at least 42 years, and there are no dependent children present. In phase 6 the male
partner is aged from 60 to 79 years and there are no dependent children present.
We now show that organising the data in this way leads to a very different picture
of income, consumption and saving in the earlier years of the life cycle, a picture
that is as familiar to everyday experience as it is foreign to the standard life cycle
literature.
4 Life cycle profiles
4.1 Family time use
Table 1 lists data means for female and male hours of market work, domestic work
and child care across the six life cycle phases. Figure 1a shows that in phase 1 both
partners work full time in the vast majority of households and so partners work
similar hours. In phase 2 female hours drop to well below half their pre-child level,
and remain much lower for the remainder of the life cycle. There is almost no
change in male hours until phase 5. The fall at this point is obviously significant, but
in no way matches the fall in female labor supply from phase 2 and thereafter.
Figure 1b shows graphically that the fall in female labor supply is more than
matched by a rise in the allocation of time to household production, with most of the
additional time in the early child rearing phases allocated to child care. This
suggests that, with the arrival of children, household production and female labor
supply become close substitutes. The most dramatic substitution occurs in phase 2.
Figure 1c shows that leisure falls quite dramatically with the arrival of children,
especially for the female, and then steadily rises over subsequent phases to give a
U-shaped profile for each partner. Married women tend to reduce both market work
and leisure to work longer at home, whereas married men tend to reduce only their
leisure hours, with the substitution being almost entirely towards child care.
Studies that organise the data by age of head diffuse the dramatic fall in female
labor supply in phase 2 by combining couples in phase 1 with those in phases 2 and
3 in the younger ‘‘age of head’’ categories. The result is a female profile that tends to
Table 1 Market, domestic, child care and leisure hours




Market Domestic Child care Market Domestic Child care
1 1772 947 – 2120 767 – 433
2 764 1541 2527 2105 813 1013 1.91 724
3 952 1811 1287 2067 871 670 2.29 586
4 1244 1887 420 2001 850 249 1.62 556
5 1048 1663 – 1704 925 – 811
6 265 1721 – 461 1258 – 948
a Weighted data means
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replicate the male profile at a lower level of hours. This may in part account for the
acceptance of the single-person model as a harmless simplification. However, the
model can lead to a serious misinterpretation of the data. For example, Erosa and
Gervais (2002) use a life cycle model based on a within-period single-person work-











































































Fig. 1 a Market hours. b Domestic work and child care hours. c Leisure hours
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[measured as non-market time] generally move together over time’’. The data in fact
show that the rise in female non-market time in phase 2 strongly dominates any
increase in both partners’ non-market time allocations in the pre-retirement phase.
4.2 Heterogeneity and time use
To indicate the degree of heterogeneity in female time use, concealed in the
preceding profiles of the time use decisions of the ‘‘average’’ household, we
partition households in each of phases 2–5 into two ‘‘types’’:18
Type H1: the female partner is employed below median hours, and
Type H2: the female partner is employed at or above median hours.
Table 2 presents data means for time allocations for market work, domestic work
and child care for each household type within each phase. On average, mothers who
work fewer hours in the market work longer hours at home, again with most of the
additional time in phase 2 spent on child care. Overall, there is only a small gap
between the total hours of work (market plus household) of each type. While the
leisure profiles of partners in both household types remain strongly U-shaped, the
choice by the female partner to work longer hours in the market carries with it less
leisure throughout the entire life cycle. Note that, on average, the two household
types have close to the same number of children. We also find that they have close
to the same wage rates during the child rearing years.19
Table 2 Time allocations by household type
Life cycle phase Female hours paa Male hours paa # dep. children
Market Domestic Child care Market Domestic Child care
Household type H1
2 26 1832 2851 2055 798 990 2.07
3 265 2069 1494 2029 867 672 2.38
4 467 2203 506 1886 889 258 1.69
5 237 1980 – 1446 29 – –
Household type H2
2 1502 1250 2203 2155 828 1036 1.75
3 1639 1553 1080 2105 875 668 2.20
4 2021 1571 334 2116 811 240 1.54
5 1859 1346 – 1962 921 – –
a Weighted data means
18 Ideally, we would like to construct the life cycle profiles of the two types using panel data. Since we
have access to cross section data only, we are implicity assuming that household time use decisions do not
oscillate over the life cycle, that is, that panel data would support the hypothesis of ‘‘persistence’’, as
indicated in Shaw (1994).
19 This finding is based on predicted wage rates with regressors including age, education and occupation.
The female wage is estimated on data for a sample of in-work records, applying the Heckman correction
for selectivity bias.
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4.3 Taxes and benefits
The characterization of the life cycle in terms of ‘‘family’’ phases rather than on
‘‘age of head’’ has great policy relevance because many OECD countries, for
example the US, UK and Australia, provide cash benefits based on the presence and
age of children. In addition, the payments are often withdrawn on family income,
and therefore vary with female labor supply decisions. This reinforces the tendency
for taxes to track female earnings in the early and middle phases of the life cycle, as
Table 3 shows.20
Household private income strongly tracks female labor supply and earnings
during the working age phases.21 Overall, taxes and benefits redistribute income
from households without children to those with children during the working age
years and have the effect of moderating significantly the fall in household private
income due to a fall in female earnings, especially in the school age years.
4.4 Net income, market consumption and saving
Figure 2 presents life cycle profiles of median household net income,22 market
consumption and saving. When the data are organized according to a family life
cycle rather than by age of head, we do not obtain the usual single ‘‘hump’’ shaped
profile of net income,23 despite the moderating effect of direct taxes and benefits.
Instead there is first a fall in net income as the household moves from phase 1 to 2,
and a smaller fall in market consumption expenditure. Phase 2 is followed by a
‘‘hump’’in both net income and consumption. Median saving, calculated as the
difference between net income and consumption expenditure, is at a life cycle peak
of $8,164 in phase 1 (see Table 4 below). This is followed by a dramatic fall to















1 79612 33800 20196 685 5140 24233
2 57928 0 14764 6009 15232 2593
3 68900 15392 17977 6400 24664 -3725
4 71812 21268 18967 4223 21583 4798
5 59176 16061 15309 4597 7560 13196
6 10738 0 5373 12125 12826 -12272
a Weighted data means. b Medians
20 For details of the calculation of non-cash benefits, see ABS (2001).
21 Both male earnings and the male wage (based on predicted values) rise across the child rearing phases.
The fall in household private income in phase 2 therefore cannot be attributed to a fall in the male wage
associated with any tendency for higher income earners to have their first child at a later age.
22 Net income is the sum of labor and non-labor incomes, net of taxes and government cash transfers.
23 As for example in Attanasio and Browning (1995), Blundell et al. (1994), Deaton (1992) and
Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
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$1,898 across phases 2 and 3. Thereafter saving rises until the retirement phase but
does not return to its phase 1 level. These results indicate that saving, as well as
household income, strongly tracks female labor supply.
The calculation of saving as the difference between net income and consumption
expenditure gives, in effect, the household’s long term saving, but this is not the full
picture of what is going on. The data indicate that many households are, in fact,
borrowing short term to meet various forms of long term contractual saving, such as
mortgage payments on housing loans and contributions to a mandatory system of
superannuation. Table 4 lists the median short term saving in each phase, obtained
by subtracting total spending from net income. While median long term saving is
positive in each phase, short term saving is negative in phases 1–4: the median
household in these phases is in the position of having to borrow short term to finance
long term saving.
Table 4 also lists average contributions to superannuation and life insurance,
average mortgage payments, the percentage of households who are home owners or
























1 2 3 4 5 6
Life cycle phase
Net income Market consumption
Saving
Fig. 2 Median net income, consumption and saving















1 8164 -2132 969 11066 61.8 49.4
2 2028 -3796 1263 9613 69.4 35.0
3 1898 -5980 1767 8098 77.9 23.0
4 5564 -1066 1669 7156 86.4 18.1
5 5772 2288 2961 4585 84.2 9.8
6 676 208 1028 505 90.5 1.1
a Weighted data means. b Medians
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for house purchase is reflected in the decline in the housing debt to house price ratio
from 49.4 per cent in phase 1 to 1.1 per cent in phase 6, a decline that follows a rise
in the percentage of home owners, from 61.8 per cent in phase 1 to 90.5 per cent in
phase 6. It is straightforward to show that the user cost of owner occupied housing,
obtained by discounting payments of capital and the initial equity at the time of
purchase, becomes negative over time, due primarily to capital gains in an imperfect
capital market and also to low transactions costs for home ownership relative to
private rental.24 For this reason we exclude mortgage payments from consumption
spending in the calibration of the capital market models in Sect. 5. Essentially, we
treat mortgage payments as a tax that has to be paid in the early phases of the life
cycle to obtain housing at a near zero implicit rent over the life cycle.
4.5 Heterogeneity, taxes and saving
The preceding life cycle profiles of incomes, taxes and saving conceal a high degree
of within-phase heterogeneity and the way in which these variables track within-
phase female labor supply. This is evident from the data means and medians for
each household type reported in Table 5.
Both types have close to the same average male incomes in the child rearing
phases. However, with much lower female earnings in phase 2 the H1 household
attracts a much lower level of taxation under the Australian personal income tax.25
The result is driven by the fact that the H1 household avoids tax by substituting
untaxed household production for taxed market work, and receives far more in


















2 47264 1986 10944 9041 -5740 -1716 -6708
3 54499 6033 16035 9230 -9782 -910 -8658
4 51984 11982 17309 6764 -1691 2730 -3120
5 34175 7347 10495 6951 4180 2028 -130
Household type H2
2 49736 32967 18584 2977 10925 6240 -1560
3 52055 36113 19919 3569 2332 5508 -2600
4 49426 38606 20624 1682 11211 8866 -338
5 43307 36051 20123 2207 22213 13156 5356
a Weighted data means. b Medians
24 The data suggest that, under these conditions, home ownership is analogous to an annuity with a high
rate of return, especially if households minimize transactions costs by rarely moving house over the life
cycle. Preferential tax treatment is also a contributing factor but cannot alone explain the user cost
differential between owning and renting over time if one assumes, implausibly, a perfect capital market.
25 The Australian personal income tax applies a progressive rate scale to individual incomes. This means
that the second earner on a lower income faces a lower marginal tax rate. This contrasts with a system of
joint taxation, which imposes a higher rate on the second income.
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direct benefits. Indirect benefits are more closely matching because education
benefits are based primarily on demographics, and both household types have close
to the same number of dependent children in each phase. Overall, the H2 household
in phase 2 loses around $16,000 of the income of the female partner. This reflects
very high effective marginal tax rates at low and average income levels due to
targeting family payments, and implies an average tax rate of around 50 per cent for
many married mothers as second earners. Once the family payments are fully
withdrawn, the marginal rates on both primary and second incomes fall to the rates
that apply under the personal income tax.26
As noted in the introduction, under this type of family tax system, households
face a piecewise linear budget constraint in the space of gross and net income, with
an effective marginal tax rate that falls with income. Two households in equilibrium
may therefore be very far apart in their female labor supply decisions but close
together in their achieved welfare level. A small difference in household
characteristics can be transformed into a large difference in female labor supply
by a piecewise linear tax system that defines a non-convex budget constraint. The
structure of the tax system may therefore be an important driver of female labor
supply heterogeneity. Other explanations include differences in domestic produc-
tivities and the price of non-parental child care.
The final two columns of the table report median long term and short term saving.
A much stronger positive association between household saving and female labor
supply becomes evident when we compare the saving behavior of the two household
types within phases 2–5. Short term borrowing is strongly negatively associated
with female labor supply.
The contrasting saving profiles indicate that much of the additional household
income derived from female earnings is used to increase saving and to reduce the
household’s short term borrowing requirements. An answer to the question as to
what drives female labor supply heterogeneity will therefore also offer an
explanation for heterogeneity in household saving decisions at given wage rates
and demographic characteristics.
4.6 Consumption and household production
As we have argued, to obtain a true picture of life cycle consumption it is essential
to include household production. We also need to include indirect government
benefits because they vary significantly across phases. In this section we present life
cycle profiles of market consumption expenditure including indirect government
benefits (labeled ‘‘mkt’’) and the household’s combined market output and
household production expenditure (labeled ‘‘mkt?hhp’’). On the assumption of
constant returns to scale of time inputs, expenditure on household production at the
implicit price of output is given by the value of time, measured here by the net
wage, spent on domestic work and child care. In addition, we report full
consumption expenditure computed as the sum of the opportunity cost of each
26 For a detailed analysis of the Australian personal income tax and family tax benefit system, and for
international comparisions, see Apps and Rees (2009), Ch 6.
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partner’s leisure evaluated at the net wage, expenditure on market goods and
implicit expenditure on household production.
We assign shares of consumption to the adults and children in the household by
computing child costs based, as far as possible, on the available data. Child costs
include the parental time cost of child care, private spending on market child care
and education, and government indirect education and child care benefits, for which
we have data. The children’s shares of unassigned market and domestic goods are
computed by applying an equivalence scale that sets the share of a child to 0.4 of
that of an adult.27
Table 6 gives the data means for these consumption variables, with the LHS
reporting the results for adult consumption expenditures and the RHS, the costs of
children.28 Consumption expenditure at the level of the household is obtained by
adding the cost of children to the consumption expenditure of the adults. Figure 3a
and b presents the results graphically.
The profiles exhibit a number of striking features. First, the paths of parents’
consumptions are strongly U-shaped, consistent with their leisure profiles. Equally
importantly, the household profiles show that children are very costly, especially in
the early child rearing years due to the high parental time costs in those years. The
U-shaped profiles of the adults’ consumption expenditures show that parents do not
use the capital market to fully smooth their consumption. The explanation for this
that we suggest is that parents face higher interest rates in the early child rearing
phases, together with a lack of access to high quality, affordable market child care.
In addition, high effective tax rates can apply to a second income. As a result, the
optimal choice for many households is, first, to reallocate the mother’s time from
market to household work, since she generally faces a lower wage, and secondly, for
both parents, but especially the mother, to work longer hours in total, and so reduce
leisure, in phase 2.
In later years, the cost of children to parents is substantially reduced by public
funding of education. When the child reaches school age the public education
Table 6 Adult consumption expenditures and child costs, $pa
Life cycle phase Adult consumption expenditures Child costs
Full Mkt ? hhp Mkt Mkt ? hhp Mkt
1 137298 78144 56507
2 75390 57163 39253 69379 22797
3 92800 60059 40715 67986 37644
4 117008 72992 51244 46836 32575
5 147111 88003 55895
6 137087 75567 47710
27 This ratio of child to adult consumption is used, for example, in Blundell et al (1994) to deflate
household market consumption expenditure.
28 Child costs of the order reported in the table are consistent with results for a ‘‘sharing rule’’in a multi-
person model estimated on time use data in Apps and Rees (2001).
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system takes over many of the child-minding activities that the household itself has
to undertake for preschool children. With a large component of the cost of children
met by government, the female partner can expand her market labor supply, while
simultaneously reducing total hours of work once the preschool phase is over.
This effect is evident in phase 3 and is accentuated in phase 4. As we saw in
Table 3 and Fig. 2, household income and market consumption expenditure peak in
phase 4, with teenaged and older children living at home and female hours at their
second highest level. Saving is at its second highest level in phase 5, when the
children have left home. Thus, the profiles of total hours of work and of adult
consumptions, are, we argue, to a significant extent an outcome of an imperfect
capital market and variations in the public funding of the costs of children.
4.7 Consumption and heterogeneity
Table 7 lists the data means for ‘‘full’’, ‘‘mkt ? hhp’’ and ‘‘mkt’’ consumptions
of the adults in the household for records partitioned into type H1 and H2 in phases





















































2-adult mkt+hhp Household mkt+hhp
2-adult mkt Household mkt
a
b
Fig. 3 a Full consumption. b Mkt ? hhp and mkt consumption
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depict the results graphically using the overall data means for phases 1 and 6, since
almost all adults in phase 1 are working full time and almost all in phase 6 are retired.
The market consumption profiles of the two household types are closely
matching despite the gap between their average household incomes. This reflects the
significant redistribution of income from the H2 to the H1 household through the
family tax system and the lower level of short term borrowing by the H2 household.
The ‘‘mkt ? hhp’’ consumption profiles are also closely matching but with the H2
profile below that of the H1 type across phases 2–4 because the former allocates less
time to household production. And with less leisure, the H2 household’s full
consumption falls further below that of the H1 household across phases 2–5.
Thus, although the second earner in the H2 household works much longer hours
in the market than her counterpart in the H1 household, her extra hours contribute
relatively little to raising her household’s life cycle profile of market consumption.
The result suggests that an important motivation for a second earner is saving for the
purpose of reducing short term borrowing needed to meet mortgage payments.29
Both types of households of course are affected by the inability to use the capital
market to smooth the time profile of leisure and full consumption. The tax-benefit
system however, rather than correcting for this by supporting all households in the
early child-rearing phases, simply brings about very large transfers from the H2 to
the H1 household. The implied high marginal tax rates on working wives are clearly
very questionable on efficiency grounds, while it is not a priori clear whether there
are gains in equity of the income distribution. For this we would need to know
exactly how variation in household productivities, and therefore in the relative price
of child care, are correlated with female labor supply across households, something
about which virtually nothing is known empirically. Our own judgement is that
policy changes to reduce the tax burden on working married women and increase
Table 7 Adult consumption and child costs by household type, $pa
Life cycle phase Adult consumption expenditures Child costs
Full Mkt ? hhp Mkt Mkt ? hhp Mkt
Household type H1
2 76755 58416 38115 71943 20617
3 97676 61130 39114 70528 36761
4 123554 74600 50276 49846 32013
5 152733 85056 51284
Household type H2
2 74026 55910 40392 66748 24918
3 7925 58989 42316 65332 38523
4 110462 71384 52212 43453 32958
5 141489 90951 60506
29 This is consistent with the empirical studies on the relationship between female labor supply and asset
acquisition, see for example Fortin (1995).
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support for child care through public investment in the sector30 would significantly
improve both efficiency and equity, as well as increase fertility. Given the
limitations of the data, the following section focusses on testing the hypothesis of an
imperfect capital market for the average household.
5 The capital market
The data we have presented suggest the following picture for the solution to the
household’s problem presented in Eqs. (14, 15, 16) of the life cycle model in Sect. 2.

















































1 2 3 4 5 6
Life cycle phase
H1 2-adult H1 Household
H2 2-adult H2 Household
H1 2-adult mkt+hhp H1 household mkt+hhp
H2 2-adult mkt+hhp H2 household mkt+hhp
H1 2-adult mkt H1 household mkt
H2 2-adult mkt H2 household mkt
a
b
Fig. 4 a Full consumption by household type. b Mkt ? hhp and mkt consumption by household type
30 Note that the support needs to centre on the development of a public investment program in the sector.
Subsidies for privatised child care cannot provide a long term solution in an imperfect capital market.
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This is consistent with the precautionary saving of the buffer stock model, though it
is important to note that the median household even in this phase is a short-term net
borrower on the capital market. The high level of saving is essentially due to house
purchase and superannuation contributions, to some extent financed by short term
borrowing at interest rates higher than those paid on saving in the capital market.
This is not only a characteristic of Australia, but also of countries such as the US
and UK with similar housing markets and tax-advantaged retirement saving
programmes.
The data show that in phase 2 there is a substantial shock to saving and
consumption. Not only is there an additional source of demand for consumption of
market and domestic goods, but the new demand for child care has major
implications for time allocation and the household’s market income.31 The
household has to decide on how it will meet these increased demands, especially
for child care. We can think of it as choosing among different mixes of market and
parental child care. One solution is for the secondary earner to drop out of the labor
market altogether, another is for her to switch to part-time working, the third is for
her to continue in full time employment, using a lot of bought in child care.
Significant proportions of households choose each solution. The within-period
model for period 2 set out in Sect. 2 suggests that the determinants of this choice are
wage rates, the price of bought-in child care, and relative productivities of parental
and market child care.
To this the intertemporal model adds capital market conditions, in particular the
interest rate on saving and the borrowing rate in the child rearing phases, since these
determine the household’s ability to smooth its consumption path. In the perfect
capital market model, we would predict a substantial switch to borrowing, to smooth
the drop in adult consumption (including leisure) that the data show takes place in
period 2. However, borrowing in period 2 remains relatively low for most
households. This suggests that the imperfect capital market is likely to be a better
model for predicting the data.
In this section we test this hypothesis by calibrating the perfect and imperfect
capital market models for the ‘‘average’’ household. As noted, we focus on this issue
due to the limitations of the available data. We do not have information on the
relative productivities of parental and market child care or reliable data on the price
of bought-in child care.32 Domestic output is missing. We therefore cannot compute
prices for domestic output and child care, other than by specifying a functional form
that, in effect, constructs the missing data. Data on individual consumptions of
market and domestic goods are also missing. While the TUS provides information
on adult leisures and parental child care and the HES contains data on parental and
government spending on child care and education, these data alone do not allow the
identification of individual preference parameters or the estimation of the
parameters of an intra-household sharing rule. We therefore assign shares of
31 An early empirical paper, Gronau (1980), also points out the strength of this effect, though it appears
less sharply in his work because he defines the life cycle on age of the head of the household.
32 Data on spending on child care available in the HES are unreliable because in many cases care is
provided by a family member, typically a grandparent, due to lack of access to affordable high quality
formal care.
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consumption to the adults and children as outlined in the preceding section, and we
treat the costs of children as a lump sum transfer. This leaves for estimation a
within-period production and aggregate demand system for the two adults in the
household. We use the estimated parameters of this system to test our capital market
hypothesis.
5.1 Within-period production and demand system
To satisfy the required aggregation conditions and for the purpose of simplification
we estimate a model in which the time each partner spends on leisure and on
household production is, in each case, treated as an input to the production of a good
consumed by both partners. We specify a Cobb-Douglas production function for
both activities and estimate the production shares for leisure, z, and for the domestic
good, y, as
sz ¼ rz þ nz ð17Þ
sy ¼ ry þ ny ð18Þ
where sz = wf zf/(wf zf ? wm zm), sy = wf tf/(wf tf ? wm tm), and nz, ny are
stochastic error terms. Within-period prices, q and p, are specified in the demand
system as functions of wage rates, production parameters and the error term for each
record.33 This specification of the production system constructs data for the missing
price variables on the assumption that households with larger female production
shares due to specialisation face lower prices because they are more productive.
We select the Almost Ideal Demand System for estimation of within-period
preference parameters. Suppressing the household type and phase subscripts, the
indirect utility function for adult i, i = 1, 2, takes the form
uiðq; p; ciÞ ¼ ðln ci  ln aiðq; pÞÞ=biðq; pÞ ð19Þ
where ci is adult i’s full consumption expenditure. The price indexes ai(q, p) and
bi(q, p) are given by
ln aðq; pÞ ¼ a0 þ az ln q þ ay ln p þ 0:5czz ln2 q þ czy ln q ln p þ 0:5cyy ln2 p ð20Þ
ln bðq; pÞ ¼ bzby ln q ln p ð21Þ
where a0, aj, cjl and bj, j, l = x, y, z, are parameters and the aj contain a dummy
variable for the presence of dependent children. The restrictions for adding up areP
aj = 1,
P
bj = 0 and Rcjl ¼ 0, for symmetry, cjl = clj, and for homogeneity,P
cjl = 0. Household demands in share form are
Sz ¼ az þ czz ln q þ czy ln p þ bz lnðc=aðq; pÞÞ þ ez ð22Þ
Sy ¼ ay þ cyy ln p þ cyz ln q þ by lnðc=aðq; pÞÞ þ ey ð23Þ
Sx ¼ ax þ cxz ln q þ cxy ln p þ bx lnðc=aðq; pÞÞ þ ex ð24Þ
33 With this specification there is the potential for parameter bias due to the endogeneity of time
allocations. However, with missing data on domestic output there is inevitably a trade-off between this
problem and parameter bias due to omitted domestic price variables.
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where Sx = x/c, Sz = qz/c and Sy = py/c, and c =
P
ci, i = 1, 2, and the error
terms ez, ey, ex, can be interpreted to represent variation in productivities or
preferences. Given adding up, we can drop the share equation for the market good.
We estimate the production system and share equations for leisure and the domestic
good on data for households in phase 1. The sample is selected on the criteria that
the male partner reports positive hours and neither partner has negative earned or
unearned incomes.34
5.2 Intertemporal demand system
The six phases of the household’s life cycle vary in length in terms of number of years
and we take account of this by discounting on an annual basis. We therefore have:
Phase 1: /1 ¼ ft j t ¼ 0; . . .; s1g; Phase 2: /2 ¼ ft j t ¼ s1 þ 1; . . .; s2g; Phase 3:
/3 ¼ ft j t ¼ s2 þ 1; . . .; s3g; Phase 4: /4 ¼ ft j t ¼ s3 þ 1; . . .; s4g; Phase 5: /5 ¼
ft j t ¼ s4 þ 1; . . .; s5g; Phase 6: /6 ¼ ft j t ¼ s5 þ 1; . . .; s6g; where t denotes the
year. We assume that within each given phase, the parameters of the utility functions,
as well as the household welfare weights, remain constant, though they may change
between phases. The subscript j = 1,...,6 refers to the phase. Introducing the phase
subscripts into the above indirect utility function we can write it as
ut ¼ a^jðqt; ptÞ þ ln ct
bjðqt; ptÞ t 2 /j; j ¼ 1; . . .; 6 ð25Þ
with
a^jðqt; ptÞ   ln aðqt; ptÞ
bjðqt; ptÞ ð26Þ
The solution to the household’s problem yields the life cycle profile of full
income, and the parameters of the within period demand functions are used to derive
profiles of market and domestic consumption, saving and secondary earner labor
supplies, for the perfect and imperfect capital market models respectively.
5.3 Perfect capital market
Given the assumed functional form for indirect utility, the first order conditions for
this problem in the perfect capital market case are
qt
dtbjðqt; ptÞct ¼ k t 2 /j; j ¼ 1; . . .; 6 ð27Þ
XT
t¼0









where W is ‘‘full wealth’’. The important thing to note is that the marginal utility of
full consumption expenditure in each period depends on the prices of the domestic
34 The results are available on request from the authors.
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good, pt, and leisure, qt, and therefore on the wage rates and the domestic pro-
ductivity. Thus the entire time profile of full consumption, as well as its allocation
within each period as between market and domestic consumption, depends on this
productivity. The solution of the system is given very simply by






 tT b6ðqT ;pTÞ
bjðqt; ptÞ t 2 /j; j ¼ 1; . . .; 5 ð31Þ
5.4 Imperfect capital market
In principle, this problem could be fairly complicated to solve. However, from the
data, we can establish that, at the margin, the average household is in equilibrium in
the capital market at the saving interest rate in phases 5 and 6, and at borrowing
interest rates in phases 1–4. It can also be established from the data that the latter
interest rates are higher than the former. Denoting the discount factors by d(t, j),
j = 1,...,6, t = 0,...,T, we can use these to collapse the single period budget
constraints into a lifetime wealth constraint, which we write as
X
t;j
ctdðt; jÞ ¼ W ð32Þ
where wealth W is computed from the full income data and the discount rates. The
household again maximises utility subject to this wealth constraint, yielding the first
order conditions
qt
dðt; jÞbjðqt; ptÞct ¼ k t 2 /j; j ¼ 1; . . .; 6 ð33Þ
together with the wealth constraint. We then have to solve the equations
ct ¼ a^tcT ð34Þ
cT ¼ WP




dðt; jÞbjðqt; ptÞ j ¼ 1; . . .; 5 ð36Þ
for the optimal time path of total income.
5.5 Intertemporal profiles
Equations (34, 35, 36) show how the optimal path of life cycle full consumption
expenditure, ct, t [ /j, j = 1,...,6, depends on the marginal utility of consumption in
each phase, as a function of the discount factors d(t, j), t = 0,...,T, and the price
index bj(qt, pt), where pt and qt are functions of wage rates and production system
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parameters. We select discount rates consistent with this hypothesis based on data
indicating that the majority of households in the earlier phases, and particularly
those in the phase 2, borrow short term at an interest rate above the lending rate.
To evaluate the alternative capital market models we test how well life cycle
profiles of consumption generated by the data can be replicated using the estimated
preference parameters and selected discount rates. The first step is the construction
of reference consumption profiles for the two adults. For this we first compute full
consumption ct, t [ /j, j = 1,...,6, using data means for time allocations, wage
rates and the tax-benefit system in each phase, and median saving in phases 1–5.
Consumption in phase 6 is obtained by compounding up previous saving/borrowing
in each year of each phase at the relevant interest rate. We then compute reference
consumption profiles for the market good and for market plus domestic output using
the full set of the within-phase demand system parameters and prices. Reference
profiles at the level of the household are obtained by adding the reference costs of
children across phases 2–4. We select a lending rate of 2.1 per cent and a time
preference rate of 2.0 per cent.
In the perfect capital market model the borrowing interest rate is set equal to the
lending rate of 2.1 per cent. In the imperfect capital market model consumptions
profiles are derived for real borrowing rates of 2.3, 3.4, 3.3 and 2.8 in phases 1–4,
respectively. Though these rates may appear low in absolute terms, they are much
higher than the lending interest rate. It is also important to keep in mind that they
represent across-household averages, and that there is considerable heterogeneity
across households in saving/borrowing behavior within each phase, particularly in
the early phases. Most households will in fact face either much higher or lower
rates.
We compare the reference consumption profiles with those generated by the
perfect and imperfect capital markets models using the same data means for time
allocations, wage rates, taxes and benefits, and the saving profiles generated by the
models. Again, the preference parameters, bj, j = z, y, x, are applied to obtain ct for
each model (as set out in (29–31) and in (34–36), respectively) and the full set of
within-period demand system parameters and prices are then used to predict market,
domestic and leisure expenditures. Figure 5a compares graphically the life cycle
profiles for the full consumption of the adults generated by the perfect and imperfect
capital market models with the reference profile. The adults’ full consumption
profile under the imperfect capital market hypothesis is strongly U-shaped,
consistent with the reference profile. In contrast, the perfect capital market model
predicts that the household will smooth adult full consumption.
Figure 6a and b compare the life cycle profiles of market and of market plus
domestic goods consumptions generated by the perfect and imperfect capital market
models with the corresponding reference profiles. Again the profiles for the
imperfect capital market closely match the reference profiles. Adult consumption of
the market good (‘‘mkt’’) and of the market plus domestic good (‘‘mkt?hhp’’) are
strongly U-shaped. Moreover, because the perfect capital market model generates a
relatively smooth profile for the adults’ consumptions, including the costs of
children results in more strongly humped shaped profiles than those indicated by the
data. In other words, evidence of more humped profiles for household consumption
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Fig. 6 a Perfect capital market. b Imperfect capital market
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of the market good and of market plus household production across the phases in
which children are present is required to support the perfect capital market
hypothesis. The imperfect capital market model depicted in Figure 6b clearly
predicts the data far better.
6 Conclusions
Our descriptive picture of a household’s life cycle time allocation, income and
consumption, defined in terms not of calendar years, but of key phases in the
evolution of the family, helps resolve some of the ‘‘puzzles’’that have been noted in
the existing literature, but suggests a new one: Why, in the phase in which the
household has pre-school children, are there such dramatic changes in time
allocations, consumption and saving? The data on borrowing and interest rates
suggest that the standard assumption of a perfect capital market is untenable, but so
is the hypothesis that households do not borrow short-term. By modelling household
life cycle choices under respectively perfect and imperfect capital markets, we show
that in the former case we cannot reasonably explain the data, in the latter case we
can. More generally, we are proposing an approach to life cycle saving and
consumption behavior which sees the endogenisation of the income process via
female labor supply choices as essential.
Our results have interesting implications for public policy, at a time when
declining fertility is seen as the major cause of population ageing and consequential
problems in sustaining social security programmes, such as pay-as-you-go pension
systems. A return to an individual based family tax system together with support for
children during the critical early childhood phase, essentially through public sector
child care and an education system suitably adapted for the age of the child, could
help overcome the problems presented by an imperfect capital market and reduce
the costs of having children. This should be a fruitful area for future research.
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